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INTRODUCTION
For the past few decades, at least, legal scholars and many
judges have treated the normative orientation of law as a given.
1
We have approached such problems as the character of legal
reasoning, the nature of rights, and the definition of the legitimate
judicial function as though these were reducible to fundamental
questions of normativejudgment. Much of the debate has been cast
in terms of conflicts among normative conceptions of justice,
efficiency, rights, morality, order, self-determination, community,
and so on.2 Today, the normative orientation remains the unspo-
ken dominant mode of legal analysis and scholarship.
Yet, recently, a small group of scholars have named and begun
to question this normative approach,3 asking, for example: How
t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974,
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I benefited enormously from
discussions with Pierre Schlag in the preparation of this article. Jean Stefancic and
Mari Matsuda both pushed me to think harder than I otherwise would have about
normativity and social change.
1 My informal survey disclosed that every recent volume of the top law reviews
contained articles addressing such issues as: Is this or that legal doctrine fair? Does
the law promote or impede the search for community? Is a particular case correctly
or incorrectly decided (and not just in a technical sense)?
2 See e.g., M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER (1985) (concerning community and
calling for law to serve as a medium for international cooperation); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HuMAN RIGHTS 93, 93-97 (1982) (embracing
noninterpretive review in human rights cases; including "the definition, elaboration,
and enforcement of values beyond merely those constitutionalized by the framers");
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1988) (describing assorted
defenses ofjudicial review, including review as prophecy for correct answers and as
a vehicle for integrity); id. at 2-7 (describing constitutional theories of implied
limitations on government that presupposed "an objective judicial method for
defining the limitations of state power"); id. at 8 (setting forth the constitutional
model of preferred rights that should be immune from government intrusion); id. at
12-15 (concerning judicial legitimacy); cf. Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 801,808 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, Politics of Form] ("The key verb
dominating contemporary legal thought is [invariably] some version of 'should.'").
3 See Letter from Richard Delgado and Pierre Schlag to various scholars and law
reviews (Apr. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with authors). Naming or
conceptualizing a new object of inquiry is the necessary first step in dealing with it.
For example, before the term "battery" was invented, abused women suffered in
silence, thinking they were isolated victims of a brutal male. Once the term "spousal
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much do we actually accomplish by promulgating grand normative
theory and elaborating public values? 4 Can normative analysis, fine
as it sounds, mask injustice and oppression or contribute to the
maintenance of an unfair status quo?5 Members of the critical legal
studies movement (cls) have suggested that some forms of norma-
tive legal thought may simply be types of legitimation. 6 Adherents
battery" came into use, it was possible to organize around it and to demand new
police protection, community programs and laws. It became possible to obtain
grants, write articles, and teach courses on the subject. Regarding the near-
impossibility of dealing with a problem that has no name, see Delgado & Stefancic,
Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple
Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989) (discussing the inhibitions classification
systems impose on innovative legal scholarship).
4 See Letter supra note 3, at 2; see also Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43
STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) [hereinafter Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go]
(suggesting that the answer is "nothing"); Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 834-
43, 874-84. For earlier critiques of normativity, either in law or in general, see H.
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 68-69 (1967) (noting that the thesis "that law is
moral by nature.., is rejected by the Pure Theory of Law... because.., this thesis
amounts to an uncritical justification of the national, coercive order that constitutes
this community"); F. NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (W. Kaufmann &
R. Hollingdale trans. 1969) [hereinafter F. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS]; F.
NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 79-80 (A. Tille trans. 1958) [hereinafter F.
NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA]; Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE LJ.
1229; Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835,
1894 (1988) (describing a proce:;s of arriving at validity through a contest of
alternative views rather than through definite discovery of objective truth); Schauer,
Constitutional Conventions (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1407, 1416 (1989)
(discussing normative arguments in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1989)).
5 See Letter, supra note 3; see also Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note
4, at 173-77 (finding the discourse oppressive and authoritarian); infra notes 48-79 &
93-109 and accompanying text.
6 See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texe C'st Moi' The Politics of Form and the Domestication
ofDeconstruction, 11 CARDozO L. REV. 1631, 1664 (1990) [hereinafter Schlag, "Le Hors
de Texte"] (asserting that Dworkin's theory of law as integrityis, from a cls perspective,
"probably the most highly refined, most highly sophisticated trans-ideological
legitimation package to come out of the legal academy in recent memory"). For a
review of cls thought, including the legitimation theme, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 53 STAN. L. REV. 387, 444 (1981) (arguing that
efficiency calculations in rule-making permit manipulation of cost-benefit analysis to
legitimate pre-determined entitlement allocations). Critical Race Studies, a school
with which I have been closely associated, is intensely interested in law's role in
legitimating racial discrimination. See;.e.g., Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections
on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 573 (1984) [hereinafter
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar] (noting the "studied indifference" in mainstream legal
scholarship toward minority writing on issues of race); Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1872,1872-76 (1990) [hereinafter Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor]
(questioning Randall Kennedy's justification of the exclusion of minority scholars
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of certain law-and-economics schools have expressed dissatisfaction
with normative ideologies as a kind of rationalization. 7 They have
challenged the dominant strand of normative analysis, arguing that
Holmes's bad man is ubiquitous and must be taken seriously in
formulating and constructing legal rules.
8
At the same time that some legal scholars have begun question-
ing the premises of normativity, scholars who study professionalism
and professional ethics have raised questions about the role of
ethical codification and the rush to promulgate ethical norms.
9
Some of these writers have raised issues of monopolization and have
seen the movement to impose ethical standards as itself unethi-
cal.10
The critique of normativity thus lies at the intersection of
several strands of emerging scholarship. The normative edifice is,
today, increasingly stressed. Just as legal realism and cls demon-
strated the weaknesses of deductive legal formalism, and just as
Thomas Kuhn and law and society scholarship shook the founda-
tions of empiricism, the critique of normativity promises a third
fundamental shift in the way we think about law. Normative legal
thought stands now in the same place as legal formalism did just
before the realists came on the scene. Its shortcomings, vulnerabili-
ties, and self-referential quality are becoming increasingly evident
to discerning readers. Not only has an examination of normative
from legal academia in Kennedy, Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1745 (1989)); Delgado, When a Story IsJust a Stoy: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA.
L. RiEV. 95, 109 (1990) (maintaining that members of marginalized groups can offer
refreshing perspectives in legal scholarship).
7 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 15-17, 20-23, 25-26, 182-85 (3d ed.
1986) (noting that economic principles explain much of law's underlying structure
and that other approaches are sometimes helpful, but rarely the whole story). But see
Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1661 (1989) (exploring
problems at the intersection of law and economics).
8 See R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 7, 20 n.2, 43-45, 137-43, 183 (applying law and
economics analysis to criminal and family law).
9 See, e.g., R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 143 (1989) (noting that "[tihe suspicion
that professional associations promulgate ethical rules more to legitimate themselves
in the eyes of the public than to engage in effective regulation is strengthened by the
inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms"); Abel, Why Does theABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 667 (1981) (noting that "the principal symbolic function
of rules of professional conduct, clearly, is legitimation"). For a discussion of the uses
of ethical codes in various fields see infra notes 51-72 and accompanying text.
10 See R. ABEL, supra note 9, at 247 (stating that lawyers "will never increase public
respect through conspicuous acts of altruism or sporadic crackdowns on ambulance
chasing"); Abel, supra note 9, at 688 (noting that "the legal profession has deliberately
sought to foster [client] dependence by monopolizing expertise").
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legal thought become a crucial intellectual imperative at this point,
but the critique of normativity may help bring about a recognition
of the way in which complacent and self-satisfied normative
reasoning obscures important political and social issues.
We cannot, and probably would not, wish to do away with
normativity entirely, any more than we could do away with deduc-
tive case analysis, or deny that law has an empirical dimension. Yet
the notion that law is normative thought turns out, upon reflection,
to be just as simplistic and misleading as those other conceptions of
law exposed by earlier generations of critics. The issue, then, is
what role is left for normativity? To this point, the critique has
focused on normativity's nature and inner structure.1 Scholars
writing in this vein systematically have been showing the circularity,
solipsism, and self-referential quality of normative thought and
discourse. My purpose is to focus on a different dimension-
normativity's uses. For I believe that, despite the shortcomings
other scholars have brought to light, we will not rein in normative
discourse until we understand how we use it and what hold it exerts
on us. Just as sociologists of knowledge made empirical science its
own object of study,12 we need to put normativity under the glass.
I begin this task in Part I, which explores the uses of normativity
in legal discourse, ordinary life, and in the professions. My method
is empirical and discursive. Much of what I have to say may seem
strange to ears accustomed to the sonorous phrases that have been
our stock in trade. Scientists said much the same about Kuhn.
13
Yet, if normative discourse is at times reflexive, disempowering, or
the servant of little-understood impulses, then it is essential that we
11 See, e.g., Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 6, at 1659 (arguing that the
pragmatic tradition of American legal thought has found it better to go outside text
and to rely on "the good judgment of the pragmatist" to solve difficulties); Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 180-81 (criticizing the authoritarian and
self-actualizing effects of the form of normative discourse); Letter, supra note 3, at 2
(noting that the critique of normative discourse lies at the intersection of several areas
of emerging scholarship).
12 See, e.g., T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 7 (2d ed. 1970)
(outlining how new theories are assimilated into scientific fields).
13 See W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 134-42 (1982) (tracing
historical resistance to new thought in science); Francione, Experimentation and the
Marketplace Theory of the First Amendmen 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 503 (1987) (noting,
"as Professor Kuhn and others have shown, the primary source of opposition to
fundamental changes in scientific thinking has been from scientists who have defended
the prevailing paradigms"); Lakatos, Fatsfication and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 93 (I.
Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970) (resisting "Kuhnian" thought).
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begin to understand how this is so. By its nature, any critique of
"normal science"14 will seem disconcerting. Yet, once the para-
digm changes, the critique's observations come to seem common-
place and true.1 5 Part I traces the uses of normative analysis in
three related areas of life.
Part IE then addresses the questions: What would replace
normative legal thought? Would not law without normativity lose
its aspirational quality, perhaps decline into positivism? And what
about normativity's role in facilitating social reform? What would
we do if we could not condemn, kindle conscience, exhort, and rally
behind such normative banners as freedom, justice, and equal
rights? Part II concludes that the critique of normativity places the
reformer in no worse position than he or she occupied before, and
is no more threatening to the cause of social transformation than
earlier critiques of law-as-logic or law-as-empirical-science.
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF NORMATIVE DIscOURSE
Normative discourse serves many functions, including a number
which many of us would be less than quick to acknowledge. There
are functions associated with: (1) the indeterminacy of normative
discourse; (2) the performative quality of much normative talk; (3) the
framing or construction of certain problems; and (4) the emotional
quality of normative speech. There are, of course, infinitely many
ways normative discourse may be categorized. My categories are
not hermetic; many of them overlap. Finally, each of the functions
I identify imposes a cost, an unacknowledged downside. Part II
addresses the question of whether there is a proper or "good" role
for normativity that avoids these costs, namely a role in promoting
social reform.
14 The term is Kuhn's, who defined "normal science" as research based on
"achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as
supplying the foundation for its further practice." T. KUHN, supra note 12, at 10.
Kuhn was concerned with the way in which this common understanding changed,
hence the title of his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
15 Kuhn defines paradigms as works that qualify as normal science and yet are
sufficiently open-ended to permit further research; they "provide models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." Id.
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A. Functions Associated with the Indeterminacy of Normative Discourse
The first set of functions I shall describe stems from norma-
tivity's open-textured nature, or indeterminacy. It is almost
commonplace that questions about fairness, rightness, and justice
rarely have a single answer. We are said to have a "mixed" ethical
system, one in which different approaches to normative analysis are
all legitimate. 16 Thus, a decision to terminate life-saving medical
treatment for an aged patient may be defensible under act utility,
questionable under rule utility, and arguably wrong under deonto-
logical principles, 17 such as respect for life. In law, every first-year
student learns about the many "policy" arguments that can be made
for or against a particular result. (Students are familiar with
reasoning such as: Jones is the best cost-avoider, so liability should
be placed on him; Smith should not be allowed to get away with X
because this would constitute unjust enrichment; Tidwiddle must
not be allowed to do Ysince this would violate Z's vested rights, and
so on.)
Even within a single ethical principle or context, it is often
possible to argue for two or more outcomes. Smokers argue that
they have a right to smoke; nonsmokers that they have a right to a
smoke-free environment.1 3  Similarly, conservatives argue that
affirmative action violates the principle of equal treatment and is
unfair to innocent whites.19 Liberals reply that it is a reasonable
response to past injustice and necessary to assure future broad
democratic participation. 20 By altering the time frame or number
16 See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS AND LAw 72-92 (1981) (outlining various ethical theories and their
application to bioethics).
17 See id. at 83-92 (differentiating among these approaches and detailing further
variations within each ethical theory).
18 Delegates from 22 countries recently called for the U.N. to recognize a human
right to smoke. See Smokers Light Fightfor Rights, Denver Post, Oct. 27, 1990, at 2-A,
col. 1 (reporting the argument that "[s]moking is a human right and should be
respected according to the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations").
19 See, e.g., L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER By DECREE 17 (1976) (arguing that the Supreme
Court, rather than the Constitution, imposed compulsory integration, and did so
improperly); Steele, Blacks Deserve 'Complete Fairness, 'Not 'Special Entitlements Based
on Color,' Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 7, 1990, at B-2, col. 1 (asserting that entitle-
ments are implemented to appease white guilt and serve only to prolong "hurt" to the
black community).20 See e.g., Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach
to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 622 (1977) (arguing that affirmative action
programs are not unfair to white males and that they rest on the "view that it is unfair
to continue the present set of unjust ... institutions that comprise social reality").
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of factors deemed relevant, one can change the outcome of virtually
every ethical inquiry.
The effectiveness of school vouchers is just one example of such
an inquiry. School voucher programs are intended to provide
parents and their children with a choice as to what kind of school
the children may attend, public or private. Thus, if certain parents
wish to send their child to a private school, but do not have the
means to do so themselves, the school voucher program extends to
these parents some form of government assistance (such as tax
credits or direct grants) to enable them to pay the private school
tuition. By creating competition among schools for students, the
advocates of the vouchers program argue, all schools, especially
public schools, would be forced to upgrade the quality of instruction
in order to retain and attract students in this new "marketplace."
Proponents contend that the competitive aspect of the voucher
system would therefore benefit all students, whether they attend
public or private schools. While school vouchers, on their face,
provide everyone with the same benefit and may make the market
in schools more competitive, 21 vouchers have greater marginal
utility for middle- and upper-income families and are thus unfair.
Furthermore, they may increase racial isolation in inner-city
schools.
22
Normative reasoning, then seems just as manipulable and
indeterminate as the other types of reasoning which have drawn fire
from earlier critics. This quality permits normativity to serve a
variety of functions, including striking a deal with the future,
rationalizing what one has already done, and self-deception.
1. Striking a Deal with the Future
As S6ren Kierkegaard has pointed out, we are doomed to lead
life forward but to understand it only in reverse. 23 We act today
21 Conservatives and some liberals favor school vouchers for this reason. On the
voucher debate generally, see Olivas, Information Access Inequities: A Fatal Flaw in
Educational Voucher Plans, 10J.L. & EDUC. 441 (1981).
2 Middle- or upper-income families can send their children to private schools by
simply writing a check for the difference, something that low-income parents cannot
do. See id. at 448 (noting that information differentials heighten this effect).
2 See 1 SOREN KIMRKEGAARD'S JOUNALS AND PAPERs 450 (H. Hong & E. Hong
eds. 1967). The quotation entered the English language earlier and in a slightly
different form. In 1905, H6ffding wrote: "But, as a Danish thinker, S6ren
Kierkegaard, has said, we live forward, but we understand backward.... Only when
life is dosed can it be thoroughly understood. This is our tragico-comical situation."
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because we must. Yet we are always afflicted with doubt. We know
judgment can only come later. Will it be kind or harsh? We cannot
be sure: Even famous judges have cases that mar their reputations.
Holmes wrote Buck v. Bell 24 and Taney wrote Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.25 Recently retired Justice Lewis Powell declared that Bowers
v. Hardwick26 was his greatest mistake.
2 7
The scroll of history turns slowly. All of us have only a thin
space on which to write. Frequently, we fill that space with anxious
writing aimed at our biographer or obituarist. The writing says:
"Do not condemn me; this is what I thought I was doing; this is the
way you must see me." This writing, highly normative in form, is
our attempt to influence those who will judge us in the future, to
tell them how we saw our act, how we saw our life. It is our attempt
to do the impossible, to bind judgment before it can be made. It is
our effort to strike a deal with the future, to say: "Do not blame
me; I was a good person."
Imagine two examples taken from ordinary life and law. In the
first, a creative artist is thinking of abandoning his wife and family
in order to pursue his art. He finds family life suffocating; he
believes his talent will flourish only if he strikes out on his own.
Yet, if he leaves, his family will suffer. Furthermore, even if the
H6ffding, A Philosophical Confession, 2J. PHIL. PSYCHOLOGY & SCI. METHODS 85, 86
(1905). WilliamJames learned of the Kierkegaard observation from Haffding. James
said: "In Professor H~ffding's ... article.., he quotes a saying of Kirkegaard's to
the effect that we live forwards, but we understand backwards .... Radical
empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute
static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life." W. JAMES,
ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM 238 (1922).
24 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In Buck, the Court upheld an order sterilizing Carrie
Buck, a moderately retarded woman whose mother was apparently also retarded. The
opinion devotes scant attention to the woman's interest in procreational autonomy
and is devoid of discussion of less restrictive alternatives (such as contraception,
education, or careful surveillance). It also makes over-drawn analogies to the military
draft and the state power to order vaccinations in time of epidemic. See id. at 207.
The opinion has been much criticized. See, e.g., S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
335-36 (1981) (relating Carrie Buck's personal realization that she had been
sterilized).
25 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The Court in Dred Scott held that a runaway slave's
temporary residence in Illinois, a free state, did not render him a free man. Unlike
Native Americans, Taney wrote, blacks were considered, at the time the Constitution
was written, "a subordinate and inferior class of beings" who had no rights or
privileges except those whites chose to give them. Id. at 404-05.
26 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
27 See Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1990,
at 3, col. 1; Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1990, at
A3, col. 1.
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artist does strike out on his own, his art may turn out to be banal.
It is a gamble. He may not win the forgiveness we afford great
artists who lived unconventionally, who took from others without
giving in return-all for the sake of their art. His children may hate
him, may refuse to speak with him again. Imagine the internal
dialogue of the artist on the day he decides to leave, the conversa-
tion he might have with a close friend, or imagine what he would
enter into his diary. Is there any doubt it would be liberally
sprinkled with terms like "higher calling," "duty to my art,"
"responsibility to myself and to society," and the like? It is not
simply that the artist is trying to find the right thing to do (although
he may be doing that as well).28 Rather, he is trying to dictate to
the future what it must think of his action. He is begging it to see
his abandonment as he sees it today. But of course he cannot bind
the future-it will make its own judgment.
Imagine a second example. An eminent nineteenth century
judge is writing an opinion. 29 The case concerns a runaway slave.
The judge must either find for the slave, or for the master. There
is precedent for either course of action. Nothing in the current
legal understanding makes clear what the judge's decision must be.
But that may change. In a hundred years, history may denounce the
judge as a monster.30 The judge has little way of knowing. He
must guess. Can anyone doubt that the judge's opinion will be
lengthy and full of detail, full of pleas to the future: "You must
understand me, this is how I viewed myself as acting. I wish the law
were otherwise, I wish the legislature would.., but there is nothing
I can do."
31
28 Compare Hamlet's soliloquy, see W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF
DENMARK act III, sc. 1 (1602), with the internal struggles ofJamesJoyce's protagonist
over whether to pray for his dying mother, seeJ. JOYCE, PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST As
A YOUNG MAN (Penguin ed. 1977);J.JoYCE, ULYSSES (Random corrected ed. 1986).
The artist had rejected religion and conventional values in order to lead the life of
a serious artist. Yet refusal of his mother's request troubled him deeply.
29 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Dred Scott v. Sandford); see
also Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?
(forthcoming 69 TEX. L. REV. (1991)).
30 See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 238-56 (1975) (describing conflicts between
moral and formal demands on judges during the slavery era and citing four such
judges who struggled with their moral beliefs in their role as judges, constrained by
precedent and the status of the law); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 29 (discussing
cases in which history has turned against the judge).,
" Both Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding
separate-but-equal doctrine), show some of these signs of the author's internal strain.
Both are lengthy and overwrought. Both opinions contain normative pleas and
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In each of these examples, the individual has an inkling that
history may not be kind, and so composes a message for posterity:
"I was not callous, a hedonist, a moral coward. Rather, I was
following this or that other principle. Please ignore that my children
were reduced to poverty, that I condoned slavery. Please under-
stand me in this other light: I was a modest, lawful, obedient,
noble, etc., man or woman."
Normative talk, then, is often an attempt to do the impossible:
to impose an interpretation, a narrative, on something the full
understanding of which can only come later. We are like the
entombed Pharaohs who had their scribes bury them with pieces of
parchment with the pathetic words, "Here lies a good man."
2
2. Rationalizing for Today's Audience What One Has Just Done
As many have remarked, religion and other normative activities
increase during times of social stress. Persons who fear history's
judgment increase the normativity of their discourse. The same is
also true of those who fear today's judgment. Their response may
take the form of rationalization, either to others or to themselves.
Judges write on a field of pain and death.33 So do many others
who have power over other human beings. This reality is itself
painful. We do not like to confront that we are, in fact, hurting
others, and that the pain we inflict is a matter of choice; it could
have been otherwise.34 And so we make our action seem com-
pelled, as though we could have done no other. Normative
discourse is perfect for this function. Consider, for example, the
"balancing" test that the Supreme Court applies when the rights of
A conflict with the rights of B, or with various sorts of state interest.
In Sherbert v. Verner,35 for example, the Supreme Court was
confronted with a Seventh Day Adventist who had been fired as a
reminders that "we-could-have-done-no-other." See e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549
(demonstrating afortiori reasoning); id. at 551 (discussing legislation as "powerless to
eradicate... instincts"); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 401, 403-15, 419, 427, 431, 451-53.
32 See also infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (concerning the performative
quality of normative discourse).
33 See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986)
[hereinafter Cover, Violence].
34 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 29.
35 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Verne is often given as an example of first amendment
"balancing." See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 789-94, 977-86, 1037-39, 1251-55
(describing balancing in other areas of constitutional analysis).
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result of her refusal to work on Sunday. At issue was whether that
refusal disqualified her from receiving unemployment insurance.
The Court purported to balance her interest in practicing her
religion against the state's interest in compelling work and avoiding
fraud in the operation of its unemployment insurance scheme.
Finding that South Carolina's refusal to accommodate Ms. Verner's
religion imposed a serious burden without any compelling counter-
vailing state interest, the Court declared South Carolina's action
unconstitutional.3 6
The deployment of such mechanical metaphors as balancing
shows what is at stake in decisions such as Verner. Either decision
will injure someone; the judge must choose.37 The notion that our
action is compelled, because we have placed both values in a
balance and read the result on a scale, is simply a convenient post-
hoc rationalization, a way of avoiding responsibility. This is not to
say that our choices are not real: What we do makes a great deal of
difference. It is the edifice of normativity that is unreal, that
obscures the nature of our actions. Imagine a child asked to choose
between two toys. The child looks first at one, then the other.
Then he looks back again. He examines each, talks to himself.
Finally, he chooses one of the toys. Is it true to say that the child
has balanced one toy against the other? Of course not. Balancing
is only the term we apply after the fact to describe what has been
done.38 We assign the things their weights, and then pretend that
it is the scale that gives us the information.
3. Self-deception
Sometimes legal (and other) actors experience personal anxiety
over what they are about to do. Normativity is a perfect vehicle for
stilling this anxiety. It hides the person of the judge, who can
reason that the decision was compelled by some principle outside
36 Verner, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
37 See Delgado, supra note 29 (describing inevitability of choice).
3' I owe this example and that of the "hidden judge," infra text accompanying note
39, to a conversation with my colleague Pierre Schlag. Many others have pointed out
that judges are less neutral and objective than we like to pretend. See e.g., C.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (arguing that judges
are not neutral but are shaped by gender, race, and class); Brest, Interpretation and
Interes4 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982) (same); see also Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U.L. REv. 343 (1991) (describing
inevitability of choice in resolving controversies that sit astride fault lines in our
moral-ethical systems).
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himself or herself. "I deeply regret that I cannot help the noble
civil disobedient, but this other universal principle (The Rule of
Law, etc.) must govern." Normativity arises out of our experiences,
not the other way around. But we must preserve the fiction that
normative principles are neutral authorities we consult, humbly and
objectively. If anyone doubts that normativity arises out of one's
experiences, rather than the other way around, ask: How many
times do you see someone change their mind on a fundamental
question of "normative" judgment-for example, abortion?39 Yet,
if normativity were a matter of argument, of making simple deduc-
tions from various principles, this ought to happen fairly frequently.
B. Functions Associated with the Performative Quality
of Normative Discourse
The ability of normative assertion to change the way we perceive
reality was demonstrated by Stanley Milgram in an experiment now
considered a classic. 40 Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University,
told volunteers that they would be participating in an experiment on
learning. In fact, the purpose of the experiment was to see whether
the subjects could be induced to violate their ethical norms and
inhibitions. Each subject -was seated in front of a console with a
calibrated dial, and told that by turning the dial they would
administer electric shocks to a "learner" seated in another room.
The subjects were told in no circumstances to turn this dial beyond
a point marked with red-doing so could administer a fatal dose of
electricity to the other subject. After the rules were explained, a
second investigator, wearing a white coat and an authoritative
demeanor, entered the room and directed the subjects to turn the
dials to particular settings. Each time, a trained actor in the other
room emitted a realistic groan or exclamation of pain. The
investigator directed the subjects to turn the dial to higher and
higher settings and eventually to exceed the point marked in red.
39 The cases of public figures who change their minds or position on this issue are
so rare that, when such a change does occur, it is reported in the news. See e.g.,
Gunnison & Roberts, Wilson Picks Senate Successor, San Francisco Chron.,Jan. 3, 1991,
at A-1, col. 1 (describing public reaction to the selection ofJohn Seymour, a man who
switched his position from anti-abortion to pro-choice, to fill the U.S. Senate spot
opened by Pete Wilson's move to the governor's post in California); In Shft Nunn
Backs Right to Abortion in Most Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1990, at A20, col. 1
(highlighting the softening of Senator Nunn's stand on abortion from totally illegal
to illegal only after the fetus has attained viability).
40 See S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHoRrrY (1974).
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A high percentage of the subjects cooperated with the experiment,
even administering what they thought might be a lethal dose of
electricity. Afterward, many subjects confessed to doubts about
what they were doing, but said they went along with the experiment
because, "If he (meaning the high-authority doctor in charge) said
it was all right, then it must be so." Apparently, the investigator's
assurances that administering pain was permissible and part of the
experiment actually changed the way they saw their behavior.
41
Ordinary life is full of similar examples in which the mere
pronouncement of something as normatively good or bad changes
our perception of it. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education
42
changed the way we thought about minorities. Reagan and
Reaganomics changed things back again.43 During war, we de-
monize our enemies, and thereafter actually see them as grotesque,
evil and crafty monsters deserving of their fate on the battlefield.
44
Later, during peacetime, they may become our staunch allies once
again.
Derrick Bell and other Critical Race theorists have been pointing
out the way in which standard, liberal-coined civil rights law injures
the chances of people of color and solidifies racism.45 According
to these writers, one function of our broad system of race-remedies
law is to free society of guilt. Although the remedies are ineffective,
they enable members of the majority group to point to the array of
civil rights statutes and case law which ostensibly assure fair and
equal treatment in schools, housing, jobs, and many other areas of
life. With all these elaborate antidiscrimination laws on the books,
if black people are still poor and unhappy-well, what can be done?
41 See id. at 65-66 (documenting a subject's continued participation in the Milgram
experiments when instructed to do so by an authoritative figure, despite the subject's
desire to stop); see also Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience to Authority, 18 HUM.
REL. 57, 67 (1965) (same).
42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135 n.12 (1982) (noting that a "black dean
at Harvard University attributed the recent upsurge in racist slurs and acts to a
change in national mood which has made such acts 'once and again respectable'").
For a discussion of Reagan's program and its effect on the racial climate, see Delgado,
Inequality "From the Top,"32 UCLA L. REV. 100 (1984).
44 See, e.g., P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 5-9 (1983) (describing the reaction by the
U.S. to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent call to place
Japanese-Americans in "relocation centers").
4 5 See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 51-74 (1987); Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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The law's condemnation of racism thus enables us to blame the
victim, praise ourselves for our liberality, and thereby deepen the
dilemma of people of color.
46
Repeated assertion has also proved able to change our notions
of the proper role of the judiciary. In previous times, courts, such
as the Warren Court, undertook to remedy poverty and injustice.
This came to be seen as a proper role for judges and lawyers.
Recently, conservatives have been asserting the "quieter" virtues of
judicial restraint and strict construction.47 They have prevailed
not so much because the argument for judicial quietism is so
compelling, but because they have stated it so often, with so much
authority and with the power to make it so. Today, most of us see
the rare case of an activist judge as quaint, or aberrational, and nod
(approvingly?) when we see judicial abstention.
Professional societies engage in behavior of this performative
sort in an effort to get the public to accept the profession's view of
what responsible behavior is, or to see another profession (e.g.,
lawyers) as responsible for the problems associated with the first
profession (e.g., medical malpractice). More instances of this sort
are discussed in the next section.
C. Functions Associated with Normative Framing
Although issues associated with the indeterminacy and per-
formative quality of normative discourse should give pause, an even
more striking set of features arises in connection with issue-framing.
46 See D. BELL, supra note 45, al. 52-53; Freeman, supra note 45, at 1050-57; see also
Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved, 97 YALE
L.J. 923, 924 (1988) (arguing that the law creates apparent and occasional victories
for minorities which rarely result in minorities' actually obtaining much benefit).
Liberals are not the only ones to deploy deflection strategies. Reaganomics effected
a huge transfer of wealth from the working and middle class to the rich. As a result,
many families had to send wives to work and children to day-care centers. When this
predictably caused an increase in divorce,juvenile delinquency, and school dropout,
conservatives blamed those affected as immoral, neatly taking our eye off causation.47 See, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 11 (1990) (criticizing activist
judges for their tendency to "legislate policy from the bench"); R. BORK, TRADITION
AND MORALITY IN CONSTITTIONAL LAw 11 (1984) (stating that "the moral content
of law must be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never by the
morality of the judge").
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1. Narrowing the Range of What is Considered
Normative discourse, as I have pointed out, is notably open-
ended or indeterminate. 48 One source of this indeterminacy is the
high degree of dependence normative arguments and conclusions
have on context.49 Add or subtract one fact, broaden or narrow the
time frame slightly and one's normative intuition will often swing to
the opposite conclusion. Imagine, for example, a youth charged
with a serious crime; the issue is how serious the punishment we
should impose. The case may be close-we have no strong intuition
one way or the other. Add one fact, however-the youth went disco
dancing moments after the crime. Our intuition changes in favor
of severe punishment. Add a different fact-the youth was abused
as a child, or is mentally retarded. We now begin to think leniency
may be in order.
50
a. The Preemptive Strike.
A prime function of ethical discourse is to confine intuition by
either broadening or narrowing the range of what may be consid-
ered. Sometimes this takes the form of preemptive strikes. For
example, in the early 1970s, the public became increasingly
concerned over developments in the field of molecular biology.
51
Columnists and commentators were warning that recombinant DNA
techniques being pioneered in the nation's research laboratories
could be used to create new life forms previously unknown in
nature. Critics were beginning to raise fears that harmful micro-
organisms might escape and multiply rapidly.52  Others were
48 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
49 See Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1, 10-12 (1991).
50 The "call to context"-to pay attention to the particularized fashion in which
experience comes to us-is associated with various modernist theories, including cls
and feminist legal thought. See generally Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, supra note
6, at 1873 (urging close attention to be paid to context); Minow & Spelman, In
Contex4 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597 (1990); Legal Strytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073
(1989) (providing a variety of viewpoints on the contribution of story-telling methods
to le al literature).
For discussion of the controversy over recombinant DNA, see Biotechnology and
the Law: Recombinant DNA and the Control of Scientific Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 969
(1978).5 2 See, e.g., SENATE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, 95TH CONG.,
1ST SEss., BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE PUBLIC (Comm. Print 1977) (discussing the
DNA issue); Bennet & Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists: The Great Debate over
DNA, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1977, at 43, 45 (describing one scientist's concern
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questioning the reconstitutive nature of recombinant engineering,
asking whether society was ready to permit scientists to alter genetic
codes-some used the term "playing God."
53
The molecular biologists responded by holding a summit
meeting in Asilomar, California. On the heels of this meeting, the
group of scientists declared a moratorium on recombinant DNA
research until ethical standards could be promulgated.54 The
debate about the ethics of DNA research quickly died down. Few
of the more searching questions the critics had been raising were
addressed by the new standards, which mainly concerned the
physical safety of the laboratories where the research was to be
carried out.55 But the meeting and new standards enabled scien-
tists to communicate to the public that the profession cared about
their well-being; it had taken responsibility and was in charge.
56
Moreover, the new code defined what was meant by scientific
responsibility in this area. Thereafter, any accusation of unethical
research could be met with the reply, "But I am complying with my
profession's code: That's what we mean by being ethical."
Ethical codes and mechanisms need not be promulgated in
times of crisis to serve this context-narrowing function admirably.
Many legal and ethical rules routinely atomize disputes and
relationships, taking our eyes off broader issues of power and social
relations. For example, new reproductive technologies, such as
surrogate motherhood, in vitro fertilization, and egg transfer, if
seen in a narrow frame, may appear innocuous, or indeed, helpful
to women. After all, these technologies do provide the means by
which persons desiring a particular type of parenthood may achieve
it. Moreover, these technologies enable infertile couples to have
children when they otherwise would have to adopt or resort to
artificial insemination. 57  Seen in this light, the technologies
with "E. coli [bacteria], containing SV40 genes, as a kind of biological time bomb").
53 See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & SCIENTIFIc REsEARcH, supra note 52, at 44-
45 (remarks of Robert Sinsheimer); id. at 89 (remarks ofJonathan King); Gumpert,
Progress or Peril? Gene Transplants Stir Communities' Fears; Scientists Are Spli Wall St.
J., Sept. 28, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
54 See Miller, Lessonsfrom Asilomar, Scl. NEWS, Feb. 23, 1985, at 122.
55 The development of the guidelines, a version of which were adopted by the
federal government, is described in M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 16, at 105-12.56 See Biotechnology: Public Confidence Emphasized as Key to any Changes in APHIS'
Authority, BNA Environment Daily, Oct. 3, 1990, available in WESTLAW, BNA-end
database (showing concern among scientists for public well-being 20 years later).
57 For development of this argument, see Ikemoto, Providing Protection for
Collaborative Noncoital Reproductio-n: Surrogate Motherhood and Other New Procreative
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simply extend personal liberty and choice. The only challenge is to
assure informed consent on all parts, to make sure the doctor is not
forcing an expensive, dangerous, or unwanted procedure on the
contracting woman, and to assure that reproductive donors or
sellers enjoy freedom of contract.5" This micro-analytical ap-
proach in which consent or freedom of contract are the only issues
to be considered neatly deflects our attention from broader
questions of power-shifting. New technologies are almost always
captured by those in power; they invariably sharpen the differences
in resources and control between the "haves" and the "have-
nots." 59 Reproductive technologies are likely to do so even more
than other types of technology, since they are developed and
distributed by a group (the medical profession) that is already
empowered and has high prestige, and then distributed mainly to
patients (a vulnerable group) who are largely female and infer-
tile. 60 Based on past experience, then, reproductive technologies
are likely to be used further to oppress and disadvantage women.
Framing the issue in terms of micro-ethics-informed consent and
freedom of contract-deflects our attention away from these other
issues entirely.
61
Preemptive strikes and issue-framing are everywhere. Human
subject protection committees on university campuses operate
under federal guidelines that define "risk" narrowly; most commit-
tees consider their work done when they are satisfied that the
investigator's consent form is complete.62 Federal animal-protec-
tion guidelines, enacted in response to animal-rights supporters'
charges of mass, wanton cruelty in research facilities, 63 are con-
Technologies, and the Right of Intimate Association, 40 RUTGERs L. REv. 1273 (1988).
58 See id. at 1289-90, 1304-07.
59 See Wikler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist
Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043 (1986); see also Weisbard, The Role of Philosophers
in the Public Policy Process: A View from the President's Commission, 97 ETHIcs 776, 780-
81 (1987) (noting that normative expertise mystified analysis of social problems by
introducing masses of detail and technical arguments; notably, the Commission
included few women or minorities).
6 See Wikler, supra note 59, at 1054-55.
61 See Weisbard, supra note 59, at 780-81 (discussing the atomization of conflicts);
Wikler, supra note 59, at 1050-53 (same).
62 For a discussion of the current federal approach to human experimentation and
its deficiencies, see Delgado & Leskovoc, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 70-
80, 92-96 (1986).63 See Francione, supra note 13, at 428-29; Metz, Suffer the Little Animals: When
Does Scientific Research Become Oppression?, STUDENT LAw., Oct. 1986, at 12. For the
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cerned almost exclusively with the use of anesthetics, the size of
cages, and frequency of cleaning. 64  Practically every group
engaged in questionable activity has adopted, and scrupulously
follows, an ethical code.65 -Casinos and take-over artists have their
codes of ethics. 66 Military academies teach the ethics of war.6 7
There is currently a boom in business ethics; 68 one defense
contractor was recently reported to have thirty-nine ethicists on its
payroll.69  There are ethics of pollution.70  Beer and alcohol
seminal work on the subject, see P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975). See also
Chase, Animal Rights: An Interdisciplinary, Selective Bibliography, 82 LAw Lim.J. 359
(1990) (providing list of sources relating to animal rights).
64 See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1988).
65 As medicine, for example, has moved into ethically troubling areas, the field of
bioethics has boomed. Academic philosophers, theologians, and others who profess
normative expertise have testified as expert witnesses in trials (e.g., concerning organ
transplants for dying patients). They have also appeared on panels and commissions
having to do with human experimentation, the ethics of gene transfer and the like.
Developments in these areas have virtually constituted a public jobs program for
philosophers and other normative specialists. See, e.g., Delgado & McAllen, The
Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U.L. REV. 869 (1982) (exploring the role of the moral
philosopher in the courtroom); Weisbard, supra note 59, at 779-81 (discussing
philosophers as witnesses and advice-givers to other arms of government). For other
areas where something similar has happened, see, for example, Brand, Editor, Heal
Thyself, TIME, Dec. 11, 1983, at 89 (reporting the adoption of ethical codes among
tabloid editors in the United Kingdom); Morality for the Medical-Industrial Complex:
A Code of Ethics for the Mass Marketing of Health Care 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1086
(1988) (discussing public relations code of ethics); Stay Home, Deer Huggers, Wis. St.
J., Nov. 11, 1990, at 15-A, col. 2 (criticizing animal activists who trail hunters as being
unethical because they violate anti-harassment norms); Movshovitz, Bang! Slash!
Crunch! Movie Audiences Love 14 Denver Post, Mar. 11, 1990, at D-1, col. 3 (reporting
on movie industry ethics); Mahoney, 'PR' Pros Seek to Upgrade Their Image Denver
Post, Feb. 15, 1990, at D-1, col. 2 (discussing public relations code of ethics); Zantow,
State's Stake in Trapping Provides Jobs, Pride, Wis. St. J., Mar. 21, 1989, at 9-A, col. 1
(discussing trappers' educational courses); Hunting Course on Targe Wis. St.J., Sept.
26, 1988, at 5-A, col. 2 (reporting on hunters' ethics course a newspaper reader had
recently completed).
6 See, e.g., Report Offers Ethical Values for Inclusion in Dealmaking PENSIONS &
INVESTMENT AGE, Mar. 19, 1990, at 37 (commenting on Georgetown University
report, Ethical Considerations in Corporate Takeover); Traders to Get Ethics Cla.% N.Y.
Times, Apr. 11, 1990, at D-3, col. 1 (reporting that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
ordered its 2,500 members to take ethics class and that it had "been formulating this
ethics program all along").
67 See Weiss, Biological Warfare Facility Debated, SCi. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1988, at 100;
Telephone interview with official at the Office of the Registrar, U.S. Air Force
Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. (Nov. 20, 1990).
6 See, e.g., Koepp, Fraud, Fraud, Fraud: The White-Collar Crime Wave Is Spurring
a Determined Cleanup Operation, TIME, Aug. 15, 1988, at 28; Ethics Group Creates
"Pulitzer"for Business, Denver Post, Feb. 19, 1990, at C-1, col. 5.; Magner, Rash of
Ethical Lapses Spurs Colleges to Study TheirMoral Responsibilities, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Feb. 1, 1989, at A-11, col. 5.
69 See Harper's Index, HARPER'S MAG., June 1990, at 15.
NORMS AND NORMAL SCIENCE
manufacturers tout "responsible drinking."71 Even horoscopists
and astrologers are said to have their codes of ethics. Recently,
when it came to light that a President's wife consulted an astrologer
in making up the President's schedule, the press was unable to
obtain information on this approach to statecraft: The astrologer
declined to be interviewed on the ground that it would violate her
client's confidentiality and her own professional ethics.
72
b. Co-opting and Redefining Others' Outrage
A second way in which normative framing maintains current
power relations is through co-opting and redefining others' outrage.
Most social reform movements begin with a small group. The group
needs support from wider society in order to flourish. Unless the
group can persuade others that its cause is just-or in the larger
group's self-interest-it will fail. 3  Normative discourse offers a
potent weapon for resisting social reformers' claims. Ethics is
always majoritarian. No powerful group ever declared its own
habits and practices immoral, no conqueror ever examined the
defeated peoples' science, art, physical appearance, etc., and
pronounced them superior to its own. 74 Normative orderings
always reflect the views of the powerful. 75 But this devaluation
70 A complex of federal and state laws and rules govern the extent, type, and
timing of discharges into the air or water. See W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR AND WATER 1, 2 (1986).
71 See Roll Out the Barrel-with Restraint, Wis. St.J., Mar. 17, 1989, at 1-D, col. 2.
72 See Stein & Roberts, Nancy's Astrologer Talks: S.F. Adviser Has Been Paid Since
1981, San Francisco Chron., May 14, 1988, at 1, col. 3. Recently, a congressional pay-
raise measure was termed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. Saunders, Now for the Pay
Raise... uh, Ethics Bil; Denver Post, Oct. 17, 1990, at 7B, col. 2.
73 See Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-28 (1980) (recognizing that whites will act for black justice
only when self-interest of former coincides with claims of latter group); Delgado, Zero-
Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of the
Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929,1930-33 (1990) (noting the need for coalition).
74 See, e.g., C. WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! 47, 55-60 (1988) (describing the
persistence of white supremacy in modern discourse as a means of perpetuating
racism); Laycock, Notes on the Role ofJudicialReview, the Expansion of Federal Power, and
the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1728-29 (1990).
75 See sources cited supra notes 46-47 & 73; see also F. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF
MORALS, supra note 4; F. NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 4. If the powerful are
really powerful, they will teach everyone that the rules are "objective," that is, do not
emanate from them, but are in the nature of things. See West, Relativism, Objectivity,
and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1473 (1990) (discussing the argument in B. SMITH,
CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988) that "all objectivist theories of value ... are
irretrievably authoritarian").
1991]
952 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:933
need not be blatant-revolutionaries are bad, feminists and blacks
are evil. Generalizations that broad would not be believed; they
would be refuted too easily by daily experience. Instead, we narrow
the frame of what may be considered a moral claim. Once we
authoritatively decide that the only ethical issues are A, B, and C,
someone who persists in demanding or condemning D can be
portrayed as unprincipled-an extremist. In higher education, for
example, departments and professional schools are assigned
"targets"-numbers of women and minorities they should strive to
have on the faculty. The numbers are based on percentages of
degree holders in the applicant pool. For many administrators,
these numbers come to define racial fairness. Someone who
demands that the school hire beyond the target or use a different
measure (such as the proportion of blacks in the state population),
is seen as uneducated or utopian.76 For an environmentalist, a
factory that is polluting a river is an abomination. To the factory,
however, the only thing that matters is following the rules related
to the type, quantity, and time of the permitted discharge. 77 If the
factory is in compliance with the relevant code of conduct, it is apt
to see the environmentalist as an impossible person, someone who
is never satisfied, a Luddite who hates technology and cares nothing
about jobs and economic development.
78
Since ethical codification teaches excuses and narrow framing,
it is often counter-ethical, at least compared to the alternative of
strict liability-never do evil.79 This leads to a final "framing" issue
associated with normativity.
76 Interview with Martha West, Affirmative Action Officer at the University of
California at Davis (Mar. 1987).
77 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 188-89; supra notes 51-
72 and accompanying text.
78 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 185; supra notes 54-55
and accompanying text; see also Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View ofJoe
Sax's Public-Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the
Possibility of Law Reform (forthcoming 45 VAND. L. REV. 1991) (concerning
bureaucratization of environmental protection law).
79 See Leff, supra note 4, at 1249 (noting that normativity is never on safe ground;
nevertheless, we know certain things are evil).
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4. The "Ratcheting Down" Effect
Not only do many professional codes frame ethicality narrowly,
leaving out what might be thought to be most important, they often
function affirmatively to encourage a sort of minimal-ethicality,
according to which actors are rewarded for being as "minimally
ethical" as possible. Students preparing to take the MPRE (Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Exam) often conclude that the
correct answer is almost always the third least ethical one.80 The
first answer is almost always wrong since it requires the lawyer to act
like a saint. The fourth suffers a similar fate, but this time because
it allows unbridled, self-seeking dishonesty or the exploitation of
others. The correct answer is the third least ethical one, the one
that neither requires the lawyer to act like a saint, nor a sinner, but
something in between. This "ratcheting down" carries over into the
real world, and into the setting of unspoken rules. Whenever ethics
is reduced to a system of rules, one need not make choices, but may
merely mechanically follow the rules. Rules also benefit the savvy
and opportunistic. They will operate as close as possible to the
rules' border, while the inexperienced or morally motivated will
remain well inside.
D. Functions Associated with the Affective Quality of
Normative Discourse
Normative speech feels good. In our society, the function of the
priest is an exalted one.81 We feel virtuous and holy when we
praise justice, exhortjudges to be fair, encourage society to embrace
community, fairness, and other virtues. It is nice to be nice-and it
feels nice, too, to say so-over and over and over again.
But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law
reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the
opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other
people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as
speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described
normativity as a zero-as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all
80 Telephone interview with an ex-student who is now clerking for a state Supreme
Court (Sept. 1990).
81 Polls ranking"public confidence" in various professions often place priests and
social workers near the top, lawyers and politicians near the bottom. See Kaplan,
What America Really Thinks About Lawyers and What Lawyers Can Do About It Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 18, 1986, at S-2.
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form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself.8 2 This
description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a
harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.
1. Permission to Ignore Suffering
The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion
in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against
cruelty, intolerance or superstition.85 In modern times, social
scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief
and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexis-
tent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as
they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the side-
walk.84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard
a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped
to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The
researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and
helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need
to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people.8 5 I believe
this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a
starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel
into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the
beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass
him by without rendering aid. 6 Someone else, perhaps society
(with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem.
Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the
rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would
otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest
82 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 183-91 (arguing that
normativity is a self-referential dosed system, devoid of content-except itself); Schlag,
"le Hors de Texte *supra note 6, at 1654-55 (observing that language and concepts can
be manipulated to fit any form).
8 3 See, e.g., H. KAMEN, INQUISITION AND SOCIETY IN SPAIN IN THE SIXTEENTH AND
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1985); A. MILLER, The Crucib in COLLECTED PLAYS (1957)
(demonstrating, throughout the play, that God was a source ofjustification for the
Salem witch hunts).
84 See Kohn, Between God and Good, Research Shows Believers No More Likely to Love
TheirNeighbor Than Nonbelievers, Sani Francisco Chron. & Examiner,July 8,1990, This
World, at 15 (summarizing various studies of rescue/helping behavior).
s See id.
86 Compare sources cited supra notes 83-84 with Leff, supra note 4, at 1249
(discussing casualties inflicted in the Vietnam War, such as those attendant to the
napalming of babies, notwithstanding the evil of such actions).
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examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has
been faced with subsistence claims.
For example, in Lindsey v. Normet,8 7 the Supreme Court consid-
ered a claim that housing is such a basic necessity that it could only
be denied or subordinated when a state is able to show a "compel-
ling interest." The Court summarily upheld Oregon's streamlined
eviction procedure, rejecting in emphatic tones the idea that there
is a constitutional right to shelter or that "the Constitution ...
provide[s] judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."
8 8
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,89 the Court
followed Lindsey in holding that Texas's unequal school finance
scheme did not deny children in tax-poor districts the right to an
education. Again, the Court responded by shaming the attorneys
and litigants who had brought the novel claim. It declined to apply
strict scrutiny, ridiculed the idea that money can be equated with a
good education and held that the plaintiffs were complaining, at
most, of a relative deprivation. 90 In Dandridge v. Williams,91 the
Court also rejected, even more emphatically than it had before, the
idea that subsistence-here, welfare-is a constitutional right. In
Dandridge, a number of families challenged a state rule that
provided a decreasing schedule of welfare support for each person
beyond the initial beneficiary and a fixed increment for families
larger than ten. The welfare recipients challenged these provisions
as a violation of equal protection. A district court agreed with
them, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state's fee
schedule, although it discriminated against large families, was a
legitimate exercise of economic/social legislation and had to be
sustained if it had any reasonable basis.
92
These cases are telling because they forced the judiciary to
confront the harsh reality that our competitive free-market system
creates losers as well as winners. What obligation do the winners
have to the losers? The answer, so far has been "none." We owe
the poor no legal obligation because the legislature did not think so;
the poor are unreasonable; they are not poor enough; and money
might not solve their problem anyway (you know how they are).
87 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
88 Id. at 74.
89 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
90 See id. at 19, 23-27, 28-32, 37.
91 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
92 See id. at 484-87.
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2. Justifying Cruelty Toward Others
Not only does normativity help us justify indifference to others'
needs, but we sometimes use it to rationalize treatment of others
that would otherwise be seen as injurious, if not downright cruel.
As I pointed out earlier, those in a position to dictate norms rarely,
if ever, see their own favorite forms of behavior as immoral.
93
Rather, we stigmatize the conduct of our enemies, people who are
unlike us or do things we do not like, for example, drug-taking or
congregating on street corners. Then, when we punish offenders
from the other ("criminal") (sub-)culture, we are able to tell
ourselves that imposing punishment is not only good for society, but
good for the offender. 4  Judges write with blood,95 but norma-
tivity is the filter that prevents us from seeing this. It focuses our
attention on abstraction, when it is particularity and real-world
detail that alone move us.
96
Even when we do not pronounce outgroups' behavior positively
vicious, we may declare it lazy and indolent, so as to justify our own
aggressive behavior. Warfaring nations, for example, often gain
ascendancy over more peaceloving nations (e.g., Native Americans).
The conquerors then decide it was their own spiritual, aesthetic, and
ethical superiority that enabled them to prevail, not their superior
weapons, numbers, or bloodthirst. 97  Often, they declare the
conquered guilty of waste, of failure to use their own resources to
the best advantage (e.g., by not clear-cutting the land), so that the
takeover was a moral duty.
983
93 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Morris, Persons and Punishmen4 52 MoNIsT 475, 476 (1968) (arguing
that retributivism is the only rationale for punishment that respects offenders, since
it alone treats them as persons rather than as means to some further end).
95 See Cover, Violence supra note 33, at 1609-18 (presentingjudges as "dealers" of
pain and death).
9 See Delgado, supra note 49, at 10-12; supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.97 See Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporaty Legacy of European
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REv. 237, 243-44 (1989) (noting that legal discourse, in opposition to tribal
sovereignty, maintained that "tribal Indians, by virtue of their radical divergence from
the norms and values of white society regarding use of and entitlement to lands,
could make no claims to possession or sovereignty over territories which they had not
cultivated and which whites coveted").
98 See id. at 244-47.
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3. Setting Up the Listener: The Doe in the Headlights
Normativity not only anesthetizes powerful actors, making it
easier for them to do their work, it can paralyze the rest of us,
leading us to cooperate passively in our own mistreatment. The
principal danger to human autonomy and worth today is large
bureaucracies-corporations, Health Maintenance Organizations,
mega-universities, and the like. Because of their own internal
structures and needs, these organizations function best if they can
treat the rest of us like numbers, according to routine. 99 Yet this
must not appear to be so-we would revolt, would demand more
personalized treatment, which would disrupt the routine. Bureau-
cracies thus adopt the discourse of normativity to make us think we
are being treated with care and consideration when we are not.
And they employ a host of smiling agents-publicists, insurance
adjusters, account clerks, claims agents, and other "front" persons
to talk soothing normativese with us. "We want, of course, to do
what is fair. You must, however, acknowledge your responsibility in
this situation. Surely you don't think our HMO should grant every
claim-we must think of our other patients." Yet the script always ends
up having been written by the Home Office. The insurance
adjuster, it turns out, does not really care for us as persons1
0°
If we enter into this numbing, but vaguely reassuring formal
discourse, we will cause little trouble. But we will, from time to
time, get a small jolt-end up blind-sided by the inexorable weight
of the bureaucracy behind the adjuster. We are like the doe in the
headlights, transfixed at the approaching automobile. Like the doe,
we sometimes think we have been spared. The automobile swerves,
the kind driver slows. The adjuster turns out to have a little
discretion, which he or she exercises in our favor: The doctor will
see us next month, after all. But the doe's problem is not the car-it
is the road. Another car will come along. Staring at the headlights
prevents the doe from seeing that problem, just as entering into
platitudinous, scripted discourse with the various insurance
9 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 185-86.
100 See id. at 189. Examples are legion. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, CU
BENEFITS 1991: WEAVING A PARTNERSIP 4 (1991) (describing "case management-a
"service provided by an outside consultant in which your health benefits are
monitored to ensure proper utilization and to provide assistance to you" (emphasis added));
id. at 5 (describing operation of the "deductible"-i.e., portion of bill the consumer
cannot deduct and must pay herself).
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adjusters of the world prevents us from appreciating our own
dilemma.
4. The Special Role of the Good Law Schools:
How to be in Cahoots
Have you ever wondered why normativity flourishes at the
good law schools, why classroom discussion, endowed lectures, and
faculty writing are full of high-sounding phrases: "social values,"
"balancing," "the conscience of the lawyer," "the pressing issues of
our day," etc., etc., etc., while the other law schools cheerfully and
unapologetically go about their business of turning out insurance
adjusters, writers of wills, and performers of other more routine
functions?' 01
In another setting, French criticalist Yves Dezalay offers a
provocative reason.10 2 The good law schools are the conscience,
the alter egos, of the big law firms which in turn are in league with
both their clients and the government. Large, powerful law firms
need government, need regulation-the more complex, the better.
Without such regulation, their clients would have no need of their
services. Consequently the good firms are intensely "public
minded." They help draft legislation, lend their partners for tours
of duty as governmental regulators, and engage in much lobbying-
all in an effort to assure that social engineering and the "wise
regulation of our economy" are carried out well-that is, legalistical-
ly and with mind-numbing detail.
l0 3
At the same time, regulation must not be too effective. There
must be loopholes, things for lawyers to do. The big-firm lawyer is
101 Compare, for example, the list of courses and seminars offered by one of the
"top ten" law schools with those offered by one further down. The former will
contain many courses dealing with law and literature, law and community, and with
various aspects of broad social policy; the latter will have fewer such courses and
more with a practical orientation. To be sure, both schools will teach many of the
same courses, e.g., evidence or corporations. But the way these courses are taught
will differ. The top schools will give them a much more normative cast; the others,
a more down-to-earth, roll-up-our-s;leeves one.
The same line of demarcation is found in the law reviews. The top reviews
publish many articles and comments of a broad public-policy nature; the other
reviews, pieces expounding, commenting on, or discussing current law. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text; see alo Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 835-36
(providing a content analysis of recent articles in the Harvard Law Review).
102 Address by Yves Dezalay, Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin
Law School, Madison, Wis. (Nov. 1989).
103 See id.
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thus a double-agent, now doing the bidding of government, now
that of his or her clients. This role, however, is intensely anxiety-
producing. And so, the big firms rely on the top law schools to
serve as the profession's conscience. We need not worry about all
the things that occasionally trouble double agents; the law schools,
Monroe Freeman, Geoffrey Hazard, and company will think about
that. By going along with the game, according to Dezalay, the top
tier law schools are in cahoots with the double agents. We train
insurance adjusters, the B or C students who will get jobs in mid-
level government and medium-size law firms. And we train and
grant absolution for the A students who will go on to even richer
and more exhilarating careers as double agents.
II. BREAKING THE NORMATIVE HABIT: WHAT SHOULD WE Do?
Well, then, what should we do? A normative question, natural-
ly-but normativity is deeply ingrained. Must we abjure the grand
phrases, look for other employment? What would replace priest-talk
among the legal priesthood, if we did? And what about those
earnest reformers, imbued with passion and zeal, anxious to move
our society toward greater and greater reaches of... (fill in the
blank with your favorite normative notion). Surely you are not
accusing them, the heroes of our age, of being insurance adjusters
too? And what would replace normativity? What would we do? A
small step from the first sentence of this paragraph: What should
we do?
A. What Would Replace Normativity? (What We Should Do)
What would replace normative legal thought is legal thought.
One does not seek to replace a disease with another disease, but
with health; a crutch not with another crutch, but with walking. We
could look at and study law, actually observing and describing it for
example. Law might become, almost, a branch of hematology."
°4
We might begin to notice things like beggars10 5 or the countless
other wounded that our system throws up. We might focus for the
first time on subsistence claims, 1°6 appreciate the dance between
104 See Cover, Violence, supra note 33, at 1601 (noting that the legal profession
writes in blood-but we rarely notice this).
105 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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huge bureaucracies and those they serv(ic)e. 10 7  We might de-
scend from the abstractions of ethical discourse and its emphasis on
deductive reasoning-this c2se is an example of that (a general rule,
so I now know how to handle it)-and focus on this. 
108
This raises the problem of all those normativos with finely honed
rhetorical skills, and all those nearly finished normative manuscripts
about love, compassion, equity, fairness, and so on, nearly ready to
be mailed out, with the usual, predictable normative letter explain-
ing why, dear editor, this article is the most normative of all and
worthy of your esteemed pages. Only three answers occur to me:
(1) we can hold a garage sale; (2) we can export our excess norma-
tive expertise to Third World countries, many of whom seem
anxious to develop bureaucracies like ours; or (3) we can try
retraining programs, like those set up in the wake of the earlier two
revolutions in legal thought. Law professors are smart; they will
pick up on the new skills soon enough. Look what happened when
the Crits and Realists came. The time between a new critique and
its successor is becoming shorter and shorter, the adjustment
easier.1° 9 We can offer summer seminars, perhaps sponsored by
the National Endowment for the Humanities.
B. What About the Cause of Social Reform?
What about Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, the law
and theology movement, and the host of passionate reformers who
dedicate their lives to humanizing the law and making the world a
better place? Where will normativity's demise leave them?
Exactly where they were before. Or, possibly, a little better off.
Most of the features I have already identified in connection with
normativity reveal that the reformer's faith in it is often misplaced.
Normative discourse is indeterminate; for every social reformer's
plea, an equally plausible argument can be found against it.110
Normative analysis is always framed by those who have the upper
hand so as either to rule out or discredit oppositional claims, which
are portrayed as irresponsible and extreme."i Normative talk is
deadening-it points us off into abstraction when it is particularity
107 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
108 Seesupra notes 57-72 & 83-86 and accompanying text (noting that particularity
and detail, not abstract rules, prompt ethical reflection).
109 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 4, at 167.
110 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 73-78 & 93-98 and accompanying text.
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and detail that kindle conscience. 112 Normativity is a kind of oil
that lubricates the shifting plates of our experience, helping us
ignore our inconsistency and others' pain.113 It sets us up to be
taken in and blind-sided by impersonal bureaucracies. 114  It
enables us to act according to lower ethical standards than the ones
we might otherwise adopt.115 It does all this while enabling us to
be comfortable with our roles; normativity feels good.
116
Yet, normative appeals sometimes do move an audience, do
cause a listener-if not to change his or her position for another-to
act on a principle he or she already subscribes to. 117 There is
nothing wrong with employing normative arguments on behalf of
one's cause. Sometimes a kind driver will actually stop for the
helpless doe. But one needs to be prepared to deal with the road
as well, and if one has the ability to do that, one can probably
dispense with the normative appeal. Accustomed to using norma-
tivity as it universally is used, that is, in its "normal science" fashion
to validate and praise the status quo, most audiences will generally
react to the reformer's message with either anger or puzzlement.
Members of the control group will be angry: How dare they use
that argument against us? And persons not members of either the
insurgent or the control group will respond with puzzlement: I
thought they meant the other thing by justice. At best, academi-
cians make law more moral in the manner of a sanitation depart-
ment-we are the sanitizers of a decaying world. For example, the
women's movement did not gain the success that it did because it
appealed to men's better natures.
Cannot dead discourse nevertheless be useful? Of course. But
we must be on guard against over-confidence. The game is rigged
against us-one cannot use categories like justice, equality, etc., to
overturn the very system ofjustice and equality that talks, redefines,
and promotes justice and equality endlessly, believes itself to be the
112 See supra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
115 See supra text following note 79.
116 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
117 See e.g., Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 6, at 577 (arguing for
diversification in legal knowledge through the incorporation of outsiders' visions into
established legal scholarship); Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge:
Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (same); see also
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2411, 2413 (1989) (discussing the use of "counterstories" to displace self-serving
majoritarian myths).
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paragon, the living embodiment of those virtues (with a few modest
blemishes here and there; nobody's perfect). We must above all
avoid the "category" mistake of speaking to the insurance adjuster
when we should be addressing the Home Office.
But, dear folks and friends, the Home Office, when you get
there, you will find, does not speak normativese at all, but a sharper,
brusquer, unfamiliar language full of consonants and commands.
This language will not pretend that we are all equal, precious
creatures before God. It will have passionate commitments of quite
different types. But if we talk endlessly, futilely, in the other
language, we will never learn what they are.
